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 [Abstract]  
This study examines the impact of social preferences on the individual incentives of 
participating in climate coalitions with laboratory experimental evidence. The 
theoretical result suggests that, when players are self-interested, dominant strategy 
equilibrium could exist conditionally. Players could be either critical or non-critical to an 
effective coalition. Their dominant strategy, either joining or not joining, depends on its 
contribution to total abatement. However, inequality-averse individuals may reshape 
the coalition formation. The laboratory evidence in this study supports that most players 
were inequality-averse and the coalition size was usually larger than the dominant 
strategy equilibrium and unstable. Nevertheless, the inequality-averse attitude was 
positively associated with the incentives of participation. Particularly, when they were 
non-critical players, egalitarians were likely to give up the free riding benefit by joining 
a coalition. Our findings help to understand the climate coalition formation.  
 
[Key words]: experimental design; social preference; inequality-aversion; international 
environmental agreements; climate coalition 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Barrett (1994), a large number of studies (such as Bahn, Breton, Sbragia, and 
Zaccour (2009), Barrett (2001), Bratberg, Tjøtta, and Ø ines (2005), Eyckmans and Finus 
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(2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006)) have explored the formation of international 
environmental agreements (IEAs) on climate change. Most theoretical simulation on 
IEAs predicted, without policy instruments, the number of signatories of a stable IEA 
may be very small (Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis, 2006; Grüning & Peters, 2010). This is in 
sharp contrast to empirical evidence. Recent experimental studies (Burger & Kolstad, 
2010; Kosfeld, Okada, & Riedl, 2009; McEvoy, Cherry, & Stranlund, 2014) have pointed 
out that actual coalition formations are usually larger than theoretical predictions. A 
growing number of studies have proposed that this challenge was due to the 
fundamental assumption of self-interest (Hoel & Schneider, 1997; Willinger & 
Ziegelmeyer, 2001).  
The self-interest has been widely employed in the majority of studies of IEAs. There 
appear to be incentives for countries to pursue their self-interest (Breton, Sbragia, & 
Zaccour, 2010). Several studies (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dannenberg, Löschel, Paolacci, 
Reif, & Tavoni, 2015; Grüning & Peters, 2010; Hadjiyiannis, İriş, & Tabakis, 2012; Lange, 
2006) had suggested that this assumption was not enough to explain actual individual 
decision makers' behaviours in public goods games. The role of social preferences (also 
known as other-regarding preferences) has been proposed to address this limitation. 
Several survey studies had also identified individuals’ social values and norms on 
preferences may influence climate policies (Alló & Loureiro, 2014; Domínguez Arcos, 
Labandeira Villot, & Loureiro García, 2011; Hanemann, Labandeira, & Loureiro, 2011; 
Svenningsen, 2017; Svenningsen & Thorsen, 2017). Also, İriş, Lee, and Tavoni (2016) and 
Lin (2017) support with experimental evidence that the contributions in the climate 
coalition are subject to public pressure, instead of the self-interest. To reach higher 
environmental standard for climate change mitigation, people with higher social values 
were willing to contribute more.  
As experimental economics provided some evidence for more complex human 
behaviour, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly 
promising. Most of them, such as Kosfeld et al. (2009) and Grüning and Peters (2010), 
suggested that countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness could promote 
abatement and enlarge the coalition size. On the other hand, Kolstad (2014) argued that 
social preference may reduce the equilibrium size of a coalition. Although the influence 
of social preferences on coalition formation has be overviewed, the influence on 
individual incentives for participating in a coalition has not yet been properly explored. 
These studies used the design of multiple equilibria, where agents have no dominant 
strategy, would limit the prediction of individuals’ decisions. Hence, this study attempts 
to answer two questions: Does the concern about payoffs of others affect to individuals’ 
decisions? How does the individual social preference influence the coalition formation?  
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This study investigates the influence of individual social preferences in a climate 
coalition with laboratory experimental evidences. A theoretical model was built to 
illustrate individual preferences in a dominant strategy equilibrium. When players are 
inequality-neutral, based on their weakly dominant strategies, their preferences could be 
either joining or not joining a coalition. In other words, they could be either critical or 
non-critical to an effective coalition. However, when players are inequality-averse, such 
clear-cut preferences and a stable coalition may not exist. There would be three possible 
outcomes: first, if players are weakly inequality-averse, the outcome remains the same 
as the inequality-neutral prediction. Second, when critical players are strongly 
inequality-averse, these players would break an effective coalition. Third, when non-
critical players are inequality-averse, these players would enlarge an effective coalition. 
This study verifies the theoretical predictions with a two-phase laboratory experiment: 
the first phase identifies individual inequality-averse attitudes and the second phase 
deliberately imposes treatments on a group of subjects in the interest of observing their 
preferences.  
There are two primary strengths in this study. First, individual preferences could be 
clear-cut and predictable in the model. This experiment design would provide a suitable 
environment to observe individual preferences when every player has a weakly 
dominant strategy. Second, in order to verify the theoretical prediction, a laboratory 
experiment was conducted. It provides detailed observations on the process of 
individual decision and coalition formation.  
The outline of the study is as follows: section 2 builds a benchmark model and an 
inequality-averse model. Based on the theory, section 3 introduces two experiments. 
Then, Section 4 reports the experimental results and implications. The final section 
concludes.  
2. The Models 
Consider a simple climate coalition game,   heterogeneous countries consider their 
participation in a climate coalition. We assume that the marginal benefit of each country, 
 , is in the range of 0 to 1 and the abatement cost is standardized in the range of 0 and 
1. Suppose that   countries join while the others do not participate in a coalition. 
Signatories would do fully abate whilst nonsignatories would do fully pollute. Two 
scenarios are considered: the first scenario assumes that countries are self-interested and 
the second scenario assumes that countries have social preferences.  
Let   ( ) denotes the welfare of country i if it is a member of a n-member coalition 
and   ( )  denotes the welfare of country j if it is outside a n-member coalition. 
Following d'Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983), a self-enforcing 
coalition of    satisfies the following constraints:  
 4 
 
  ( 
 )    ( 
   )     (Eq.1) 
  ( 
 )    ( 
   )     (Eq.2)     
The internal constraint (Eq.1) denotes that a signatory has no incentive to leave the 
   member coalition and becomes a non-signatory. The external constraint (Eq.2) 
indicates that a non-signatory have no incentives to participate in a coalition as the 
(    )-th member. When both constraints are satisfied, a    member stable coalition 
would exist.  
2.1 Benchmark model with self-interest preference 
When countries are self-interested, following Lin (2017), a country’s welfare function 
is equal to the country’s own payoff which depends on the number of signatories and its 
membership status. In a profitable  -member coalition, non-signatories do full pollute. 
The payoff of a non-signatory    (  ) is the product of its marginal benefit rate and the 
total abatement from signatories. On the other hand, all signatories work as one to do 
full abatement and pay the standard cost. The coalition payoff (  ) is the joint payoffs of 
  members (           ) and can be written as    ∑   
 
    ∑ [(  )     ]
 
   . 
Signatories share the coalition payoff equally among signatories. Hence, the payoffs of a 
nonsignatory   and a signatory   are written respectively as  
              (Eq.3) 
   (  )  ∑   
 
    
    (Eq.4) 
Taking (Eq.3) and (Eq.4) into the internal and external constraints (Eq.1) and (Eq.2), a 
stable coalition exist as the constraints are satisfied. Though the formation of coalition is 
predictable, multiple stable coalition combinations existed in the past experimental 
studies, such as Kosfeld et al. (2009) and Burger and Kolstad (2010). In other words, the 
size of coalition might be predictable, individual decisions were not. Due to no clear-cut 
preference for countries, these studies failed to foresee individual decisions in the 
membership game. This study, in order to have better prediction on individual 
decisions, focus on the cases of dominant strategy equilibrium. To reach such unique 
equilibrium, an additional condition should be satisfied: 
    ∑   
 
            (Eq.5) 
These constraints and condition categorise countries into two groups: critical and 
non-critical countries. Critical countries, with larger marginal benefits, are essential to an 
effective coalition. Therefore, the weakly dominant strategy of critical players is to 
participate in a coalition. Non-critical countries, with smaller marginal benefits, can 
contribute the coalition but not necessary. The weakly dominant strategy of non-critical 
players is not to participate. 
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The condition (Eq.5) also implied that any critical country would not be replaced by 
all of the non-critical countries. The condition ensures that the coalition is the only stable 
combination to be profitable. In other words, critical countries would participate in a 
coalition because they were necessary members and non-critical countries would not 
participate because they could take advantage from free-riding. While we acknowledge 
this is indeed a strong condition, in order to identify the individual incentives to 
participate in the coalition, this condition provided better observation of the individual 
decisions in the membership game.  
2.1 Inequality-averse preference in a coalition game 
Let us now consider the scenario of inequality-averse preferences. Different from (Eq. 
3) and (Eq.4), the welfare of a country   (  [   ]) depends on not only its own payoff 
but also the payoff gaps between its and others. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the 
magnitude of inequality-aversion indicates the level of dislike for unfair outcomes. The 
inequality-averse welfare of a country    
  ( )     
  
   
∑    (        )   
  
   
∑    (        )    (Eq.6) 
where    is any other country except  . The first term is the payoff of country  . The 
second and third terms represent the average payoff gap from the other country    with 
the disadvantage-loss parameter   and advantage-loss parameter   , respectively. Both 
of the parameters presented an inequality-averse magnitude of   and were between 0 
(inequality-neutral) and 1 (strongly inequality-averse). Due to the abatement cost, a 
critical country earns a lower payoff than what a non-critical player has. A critical 
country faces the disadvantage-loss only. On the other hand, depends on its marginal 
benefit, a non-critical country may have both advantage-loss and disadvantage loss.  
When inequality-aversion is taken into the internal and external constraints (Eq.1) 
and (Eq.2), the coalition formation depends on the individual inequality-averse 
magnitudes. The coalition formation could become either a stable   -member coalition, 
unstable, or a stable coalition larger than   . When all of the countries were inequality-
neutral or weakly inequality-averse, a stable   -member coalition exists as the self-
interested outcome. When a critical country was strongly inequality-averse, the country 
feels disadvantaged from the payoff gap between players. The internal constraint has 
been changed by the absence of such country from the effective coalition. Nevertheless, 
the country has the incentive to participate if everyone yields nothing from a collapsed 
coalition. Therefore, the coalition formation became unstable. In the last circumstance, 
when any non-critical country was strongly inequality-averse, that country could 
participate to mitigate the payoff gap. Therefore, the external constraint has been 
changed so that the coalition size is expanded and larger than   .  
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Intuitively, there were a number of effects with inequality-aversion. First, 
egalitarianism reduces the individual welfare when the payoffs among the countries 
were not equal. A coalition could be enlarged by a non-critical egalitarian country, when 
it sought for smaller advantage loss. Second, the transfer mechanism where signatories 
equally shared the coalition payoff could minimise the payoff gap among the countries. 
However, except for a grand coalition, signatories always suffered the disadvantage loss 
from non-signatories. An expanding IEA tended to exacerbate the payoff gap between 
the signatories and the non-signatories. Egalitarian signatories could punish free-riders 
behaviour by turning down an effective IEA. In other words, the effects of inequality-
aversion could shape the stability and the formation of IEAs both internally and 
externally.  
3. Experiment Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC) 
laboratory at the University of York (UK) and programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Fifty subjects were invited through the Online Recruitment System (Greiner, 2004). 
They were students from different countries and studied various disciplines. In order to 
understand the coalition formation, we mimicked the diversity in the real world where 
decision makers have different nationalities and multidisciplinary knowledge in this 
experiment.  
A pre-experimental questionnaire gathered demographic information, including the 
subjects’ degree disciplines, age (the year they were born), ethnicity, political orientation, 
and their level of belief in a religion. Another two questions collected information about 
their self-evaluated preferences. The question regarding religion identified the subjects’ 
belief attitude on a scale ranging from 1 (not religious at all) to 5 (extremely religious). 
The distribution of the level of religious attitude showed that most subjects considered 
themselves as mild belief. The last question aimed to indicate the subjects’ political 
preference (level one indicates left, level two indicates centre-left, level three indicates 
neutral, level four indicates centre-right, and level 5 indicates right). The distribution 
showed that most respondents were pro-left wingers.  
In order to ensure data quality, the subjects had to comprehend the rules of the game 
as much as possible. They were not allowed to exchange information and no 
conversation was allowed (except for asking the experimenter to clarify the questions) 
during the experiment. The experimenter introduced the rules and gave the participants 
time to read through the instructions thoroughly and to accomplish the controlled 
questions. At the beginning of each part of the experiment, four control questions were 
asked in order to test the subjects’ understanding. The experiment started when all of 
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the subjects had answered all of the control questions correctly. It was comprised of two 
phases with the following design. 
3.1 An inequality-averse preference test 
In this test, we aimed to examine the individuals’ attitudes towards inequality-
aversion. In order to extract information from a purified environment, the subjects were 
paired without knowing their partners or their partners’ decisions. Each subject had two 
roles: dictator and receiver. A receiver passively earned allowance from the dictator’s 
decision. A dictator, on the other hand, decided to share a £5 allowance with his/her 
receiver. There were two ways to share as shown in Table.1. Option 1 shared the 
allowance equally, while option 2 allocated the allowance unjustly with an all-or-
nothing allocation at a certain probability.   
Table.1. Inequality-aversion Test 
Round Option 1 Option 2 
1 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability   0%;  (£5, £0) with probability 100% 
2 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  10%;  (£5, £0) with probability  90% 
3 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  20%;  (£5, £0) with probability  80% 
4 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  30%;  (£5, £0) with probability  70% 
5 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  40%;  (£5, £0) with probability  60% 
6 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  50%;  (£5, £0) with probability  50% 
7 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  60%;  (£5, £0) with probability  40% 
8 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  70%;  (£5, £0) with probability  30% 
9 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  80%;  (£5, £0) with probability  20% 
10 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability  90%;  (£5, £0) with probability  10% 
11 (£2.5, £2.5) for sure (£0, £5) with probability 100%;  (£5, £0) with probability   0% 
 
Option 1 was a fair allocation where the dictator faces no unfair loss. On the other 
hand, the all-or-nothing allocation in option 2 indicated two extreme cases. As described 
in (Eq.6), an inequality-averse agent considered both advantage-loss and disadvantage-
loss. The range of the two extremities could be normalised. The range between two 
extreme unfair outcomes was normalised, so both the advantage- and disadvantage-
losses could be merged as one inequality-averse indicator. Although a subject might 
suffer more from disadvantage than advantage, two reasons supported this technique. 
In practice, it is not easy to find a subject's preference without standardising the unit of 
the utility. In the literature, the experimental evidence showed that the disadvantage 
factor was not necessarily smaller than the advantage factor (Dannenberg, Riechmann, 
Sturm, & Vogt, 2012; Yang, Onderstal, & Schram, 2016). In round 1, the all-or-nothing 
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allocation would be taken by a rational subject because the outcome was definitely 
better than that from option 1. By contrast, in the final round, the outcome for the fair 
allocation was better than that for the all-or-nothing allocation. For each subject with a 
consistent preference, there existed a point with a certain probability where the subject 
would switch from the all-or-nothing allocation to the fair allocation. The switch point 
indicated the individuals’ attitudes toward inequality-aversion.  
If the subjects were self-interested, then their welfares were the same to their 
monetary payoffs. In other words, they would switch when the expected outcome of all-
or-nothing allocation was equal to that of fair allocation. If subjects were inequality-
averse, their utilities were lower than their monetary payoffs. They were more likely to 
take an equal allocation in order to avoid extremely unfair consequences. Inequality 
acceptors, which never chose an equal allocation, could be possible, but they were 
uncommon in reality (as seen in the experimental results later). They could be captured 
in this experimental design. Therefore, we excluded those inequality acceptors from our 
analyses, similar to (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
It is important to bear in mind that this test could be characterised by strategic 
uncertainty due to the fact that a series of probabilities were involved. The subjects’ risk 
attitudes might have been involved in their decisions. In other words, it might have 
been difficult to distinguish the risk aversion and inequality aversion in this study. This 
issue might be avoided by employing two separate games in order to indicate the 
attitudes toward disadvantage- and advantage-aversion, such as those developed by 
Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011) and (Yang et al., 2016). However, this study 
was superior for two reasons. First, the two-games created another bigger issue in that 
the measurement of two attitudes might have been biased. Second, there was a 
significant positive correlation between the inequality-aversion and risk-aversion 
(Carlsson, Daruvala, & Johansson‐Stenman, 2005; Kroll & Davidovitz, 2003). It was 
unnecessary to distinguish the inequality-aversion from the risk-aversion. 
3.2 Coalition game  
This public goods game mimicked the climate coalition conventions. The subjects 
were assigned different roles in a group of five anonymous persons for the entire 
session. As described in Equations (1) and (2), the payoffs depended on the marginal 
benefit of the total abatement. In this study, we built eight treatments of various 
marginal benefits. Each group played four treatments. Each treatment had 2 to 4 critical 
players whilst the rest played a role of non-critical. As explained earlier, based on the 
assumption of self-interest, the unique-equilibrium design could help to identify 
individual decisions. As illustrated earlier, critical players were essential for a profitable 
coalition, while non-critical players had the incentive to free ride.  
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When the subjects had strong inequality-averse attitudes, then the critical players 
might have had the incentive to break the coalition internally. On the other hand, non-
critical players might have given up the free-riding benefit by participating in a coalition. 
In this study, we assigned each subject a particular payoff table, which contained all of 
the possible payoffs with the corresponding coalition combinations. The payoff 
depended on the given parameters and the coalition formation. For any unprofitable 
coalition, all of the subjects in the group gained nothing in return. The possible payoffs 
for the subjects ranged from £0 up to £24. 
4. Experimental Results and Analyses 
The results for the inequality-averse test demonstrated that 31 out of the 50 subjects 
had clearly switched from the all-or-nothing allocation to the fair allocation. In 
particular, 2 subjects stuck with the fair allocation for the entire session. Their 
behaviours indicated their individual attitude toward inequality-aversion.  
Table.2. Number of Fair Allocation taken 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Number for Fair Allocation Taken 10 11 8 23 33 35 48 48 47 48 46 
 
Table 2 presents the number of fair allocations taken in each round. Initially, most of 
the subjects preferred the all-or-nothing allocation. Then, their decisions switched to the 
fair allocation. When the expected payoff of all-or-nothing became lower than that of the 
fair allocation, it is unsurprising that almost everyone took the fair allocation.   
Regarding the coalition formation in the membership game, effective coalitions were 
formed in 387 out of 600 rounds, and the formation was usually larger than the self-
interested equilibrium size. The actual coalition formation matched the self-interested 
equilibrium in only 112 rounds. The coalitions were usually neither stable nor 
convergent to a particular coalition. With the same treatments, the coalition formation 
varied in different groups. For example, group 6 and group 8 both took treatments 5 to 8. 
Group 6 formed profitable coalitions in 47 rounds, but group 8 achieved profitable 
coalitions in only 12 rounds.  
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Table.3. Probit Estimations of Probability of Joining a Coalition 
Variable 
Probit 
MLE(1) 
Probit 
MLE(3) 
Probit 
MLE(5) 
Constant term 
15.00 
(12.37) 
4.81 
(16.74) 
21.56 
(16.81) 
Inequality-Averse Attitude 
0.69 ** 
(0.17) 
0.70 ** 
(0.26) 
0.53 * 
(0.23) 
Age 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
Politic Attitude 
0.09 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.14 ** 
(0.05) 
0.31 ** 
(0.04) 
Religious Attitude 
-0.06 ** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.23 ** 
(0.03) 
Critical player 
1.16 ** 
(0.06) 
  
Marginal Benefit   
-8.80 ** 
(1.07) 
Past Total Contribution 
0.57 ** 
(0.11) 
0.97 ** 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
Total Observations 2,520 1,400 1,120 
Observations of Joining  
(% of total observation) 
1,692  
(67%) 
1,185  
(85%) 
507  
(45%) 
Log Likelihood -1339.29 -568.96 -697.09 
Note: Each cell contains coefficient and standard error in parenthesis. *, ** are significant at 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
 
Turning now to the factors that might have affected the individual decisions, the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the binary probit regressions were employed as 
shown in Table 3. The variables included individual inequality-averse attitude (the 
times of taking the fair allocation), age (the year the subjects were born), the political 
attitudes from left to right, the religious attitudes from atheist to religious, the dummy 
variable of being critical players, the marginal benefit of the total contribution, and the 
group contribution in the previous round. Although the experimental design allowed 
for the existence of inequality lovers, which were players never chose an equal 
allocation. They were uncommon in reality as well as the experimental studies. 
Therefore, similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), five inequality lovers were excluded and 
2,700 observations were used for our analyses. 
The estimation of Probit MLE(1) covered the observations of 2,520 individual 
decisions which exclude the decisions in the first round of the treatment. Among these 
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observations, nearly 70% of them decided to participate in a coalition. The inequality-
averse, political and religious attitudes, the dummy variable of being critical players, 
and the total contribution in the previous round had significant positive effects on the 
decisions. As we predicted, subjects usually chose the dominant strategy. The strongly 
inequality-averse subjects were more likely to participate in a coalition. While the 
coalition size was larger in the past round, subjects were more likely to cooperate. The 
result also suggests that pro-right-wingers were more likely to cooperate and 
religionists were not. 
Probit MLE(2) examines the observations of the critical players who were essential to 
form an effective coalition. 85% out of the 1,500 observations participated in a coalition. 
Though the theoretical prediction suggested that egalitarians might break a coalition 
internally. In contrast, the experimental result shows that the internal stability was 
ensured by the subjects with stronger inequality-averse attitudes. This interesting result 
might be illustrated as inequality-aversers were more likely to cooperate while more 
people cooperated. This was due to the cooperation could mitigate the payoff gaps 
between players.  
Interestingly, pro-left-wingers were more likely to cooperate when they were critical 
to an effective coalition. That being said, subjects had stronger incentives to form a 
profitable coalition when they were egalitarians or pro-left-wingers. The coalition size in 
the past round was positively associated with the cooperation of the critical players. 
There are two contradictory effects of a larger coalition. The first effect is a larger payoff 
gap between signatories and free-riders. This would cause more disadvantage loss. The 
second effect is the gaps between less players. This would make less loss.  
The estimation of Probit MLE(3) assesses the non-critical players those did not have 
to cooperate. The results showed that the free-riding incentives were rejected for nearly 
half of the 1,120 observations. Again, egalitarians were more likely to compromise and 
cooperate. Subjects with stronger attitudes towards inequality-aversion were more 
likely to participate in a coalition. Apart from the inequality-averse attitudes, the 
estimation examines the factors of free-riding. Non-critical players receive free-riding 
incentives from two factors: its marginal benefit and the coalition size. Our finding 
claims that high marginal benefit could lead to low cooperation. It was intuitive that 
non-critical players were less cooperative due to higher free-riding incentives. In 
contrast to the experimental study of Burger and Kolstad (2010), this study does not 
support their earlier finding that high marginal benefit would increase a coalition size. 
On the other hand, another free-riding incentives from the past coalition size was 
insignificant to the willingness of participation.  
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There are more important policy implications from our results. Individual political 
and religious attitudes had significant effects on the individual cooperation. In contrast 
to their preferences when they were critical, the pro-left-wingers were less cooperative 
when they were non-critical. On the other hand, the atheists were more likely to 
cooperate when they were non-critical.   
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This is the first investigation that examines the impacts of social preferences on the 
individual incentives of participating in climate coalitions by using laboratory evidence. 
We consider a case of dominant strategy equilibrium which players could be either 
critical or non-critical to an effective coalition. A critical player was essential and cannot 
be replaced by all non-critical players. Theoretically, when countries with social 
preferences, egalitarians could reshape the coalition internally and externally. The 
coalition size might remain as the dominant strategy equilibrium, be enlarged, or 
unstable. Though this study was limited in the sample scale and specific case of 
dominant strategy solution, but it confirms causal links to individual participation in a 
climate coalition from inequality-averse, politic and religious attitudes, the free-riding 
incentive, and the past coalition contribution.  
Turning back to answer the research questions, the coalition formation could be 
influenced by individual social preferences. This study suggests that the inequality-
averse attitudes had significant positive association with the incentives of participation. 
In particular, when the subjects were non-critical players, the egalitarians were likely to 
give up the free-riding benefit by joining a coalition. This result could explain why the 
coalition formation was usually larger than the Nash equilibrium.  
This study has multiple implications for public opinion elicitation and public policy. 
Our findings suggest that it is important to highlight not only the individual payoff but 
also the gap between players. Some significant factors could be illustrated intuitively. 
For instance, the past coalition size and the marginal benefit were associated with the 
incentives for critical and non-critical players. Apart from that, other factors may not 
have been intuitive. For example, the pro-left-wingers behaved strategically: they were 
cooperative when they were critical and less cooperative when they were non-critical to 
an effective coalition. In addition, those atheists were more cooperative when they were 
non-critical.  
In conclusion, individual concerns for others do influence the coalition formation. 
No matter whether they were critical or not, inequality-aversion could lead to more 
participation in a coalition. The results of this study also suggested that the individual 
motivation could be affected by their political and religious attitudes. The implications 
could advise policy makers on constructing a solid climate coalition for a better future.   
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